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This paper describes the current arrangements for the provision of pensions in 
the United Kingdom. In particular, it describes the means by which the current 
and future public-sector cost of pensions has been controlled or reduced and 
private-sector provision has been encouraged. 
The outstanding feature of  the U.K. pension system is that, under current 
policies, public expenditure on pension provision  will remain modest, com- 
pared with other industrial economies. For example, Chand and Jaeger (1996) 
estimate that the present value of the difference between the United Kingdom’s 
public-pension expenditure and revenue up to 2050 is 4.6 percent of GDP, with 
existing policies and current contribution rates. This compares with a ratio of 
26 percent for the United States and above 100 percent for Japan, Germany, 
and France. Current actuarial projections are that contribution rates will fall by 
4 percentage points between now and the middle of the next century, in stark 
contrast  with  conditions  elsewhere.  The projected  success  in  constraining 
public expenditure on pensions helps explain, in large part, why the United 
Kingdom avoids the longer-term fiscal crises forecast (under current policies) 
elsewhere.  Shigehara (1995) estimates that the level of  general government 
financial liabilities in the United Kingdom will be negative (i.e., there will be 
net assets) in 2030, compared with liabilities of 300 percent of GDP in Japan 
and 100 percent or more in the United States, Germany, France, and Italy. 
This can partly be explained by more favorable (or less unfavorable) demo- 
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graphic developments. (The “greying” of the U.K. population occurs later, and 
less dramatically, than elsewhere.) But the most important cause is the fixing 
of the value of the basic state pension in real terms. In addition, the future cost 
of  the state’s second-tier pension  has been  significantly  cut by  reducing  the 
generosity of the benefits and by encouraging people to leave the scheme and 
move to private provision. Although the ratio of pensioners to the population 
of working age is forecast to rise from 30 percent  in  1995 to 38 percent in 
2030, the ratio of public expenditure on pensions to GDP is expected to fall 
over the same period, from 4.2 to 3.3 percent. One result of these changes is 
that  the  state pension  (and other social security benefits) accounts  for only 
about half  the average pensioner  income. This ratio will continue to fall in 
the future. 
Another  feature  that distinguishes  the United  Kingdom from many  other 
industrialized countries, particularly those in continental Europe, is that most 
of its occupational pension liabilities are already funded. U.K. private-sector 
pension funds have E600  billion  worth of investments, more than the rest of 
the European Union put together. 
However, current arrangements are not universally  accepted as satisfactory. 
In particular, the current level of the basic state pension is slightly lower than 
the level of income support (a general means-tested benefit). The final sections 
of the paper describe some proposed reforms of the system. 
Broadly, the U.K. system consists of a flat-rate basic state pension based on 
contributions.’ There are also means-tested welfare benefits for those deemed 
to have inadequate income.* Second-tier pensions for employees are provided 
either by the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) or by occupa- 
tional  or personal  pension  schemes. All  employees  (with incomes above  a 
lower limit) must belong to either SERPS or an appropriate private scheme. 
(There are currently about 22 million employees in the United Kingdom.) The 
state system (flat rate and SERPS) is pay as you go. Private schemes are usually 
funded, although there are unfunded schemes for some public-sector employ- 
ees. Approximately 73  percent of all employees are members of occupational 
pension  schemes or  have  personal  pensions.  Twelve  percent  are  only  in 
SERPS. (About 5 percent of employees are in both occupational schemes and 
SERPS.) The 15 percent who are not covered consist mainly of those on low 
incomes. Over their lifetimes, such individuals are likely to accrue some enti- 
tlements. 
1.  Since we employ U.K. usage in this paper, American readers may find the following glossary 
helpful  (the British term precedes the American): flat rate = lump sum; occupational = private; 
pensioner = retiree; pensions = social security; personal pensions = individual retirement ac- 
counts, 401(k)  plans; preserved benefits = deferred benefits; social security = welfare plus social 
security; state = Ceederal. 
2.  Welfare benefits available to U.K. pensioners include free medical treatment and medicines; 
free nursing care; means-tested long-term nursing or residential  care; meanq-tested support to pay 
for housing and other living expenses; help with cleaning and other domestic duties for the frail 
infirm; and hot meals for the frail infirm living at home. 101  The Pension System in the United Kingdom 
3.1  The State Pension System3 
3.1.1  The Basic State Pension 
The full basic state pension is currently (1996-97)  f61.15 per week. This is 
about 15 percent of average full-time male  earning^.^ The pension is taxable. 
Current policy is to raise the pension annually in line with retail price inflation. 
Between  1975 and  1980, the policy  was to uprate the pension  in line with 
prices or average earnings, whichever was the greater. Before  1975, ad hoc 
increases had kept roughly in line with earnings increases since 1948. 
Entitlement is based on a contributions record. Payment of the full level of 
benefit depends on the payment of contributions, or the receipt of credits, for 
about 90 percent of a working life (currently forty-nine years for a man and 
forty-four years for a woman). Contributions or credits of forty-four or more 
years for men and thirty-nine or more years for women entitle contributors to 
the full pension. Pensioners  over eighty can receive the state pension  (at a 
reduced rate) on a noncontributory basis. 
Mamed women receive pensions on the basis of their own or their husband's 
contributions, whichever is more favorable. Almost all male pensioners receive 
the full pension, whereas only about 1.7 million of 6.1 million female pension- 
ers receive the full pension on the basis of their own contributions. This posi- 
tion is steadily being changed by the introduction, in 1978, of home responsi- 
bilities protection (HRP), which provides credits for women who are out of 
work and caring for children or other dependents, and, in the same year, by the 
introduction of a requirement that married women must contribute to the Na- 
tional Insurance System and thus acquire entitlement to full pensions. An in- 
creasing proportion of women will thus become entitled to the full basic pen- 
sion on the basis of their own contributions or credits. 
The basic pension for single people is currently about 9 percent lower than 
the level of income support to which poor single pensioners are entitled. For 
couples the pension is about 6 percent lower. The gap is even larger for older 
pensioners because income support increases at ages seventy-five and eighty. 
The cost in 1994-95 of the basic state pension was f27  billion (4 percent of 
GDP). Means-tested benefits to pensioners cost a further E8.5 billion. 
The ratio of the state pension to average earnings has fallen from about 20 
percent in 1977-78  to about 15 percent now. If real earnings grow by  1% per- 
cent a year (which is a modest estimate relative to past trends), the ratio will 
3. Much of the material in this paper is based on Johnson, Disney, and Stears (1996). Their 
comprehensive report on the U.K. pensions system formed volume 2 of the report of the Retire- 
ment Income Inquiry. Descriptions of the system and discussions of the main policy issues can be 
found in Blake (1995) and Dilnot et al. (1994). 
4.  Although the basic pension has declined relative to average earnings, it has stayed broadly 
constant at 20 percent of average manual male earnings throughout its ninety years of existence. 
In the United Kingdom, as in the United States, there has been a significant increase in the disper- 
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Table 3.1  Projected Cost of Basic Pension (fbillion, 1994-95 prices) 
1994-95  2000-2001  2010-11  2020-21  2030-31 
Price indexed  26.9  29.8  33.6  35.2  41.9 
Earnings indexed  26.9  32.6  42.6  51.8  71.6 
Nore: As a guide to the scale of these costs, GDP in  1994-95  was 5680 billion 
fall to 9 percent by 2030. For the low paid, the basic state pension is likely to 
remain a substantial proportion of their retirement income. 
The projected cost of the basic state pension is shown in table 3.1. For com- 
parison, the table also shows the cost if  the basic pension  is uprated in line 
with earnings (at an assumed growth of  1 !h percent a year). 
3.1.2  The State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme 
The State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) serves two functions 
in the U.K. system. It provides a second-tier pension for its members (about 
17 percent of total employees), and it establishes the minimum (in terms of 
either benefits or contributions) for those who can be permitted to opt out of 
the  state’s second-tier  system  and to use  occupational  or personal  pension 
schemes instead. 
As subsequent sections will show, SERPS has changed significantly since it 
was first introduced. It is an earnings-related pay-as-you-go scheme. Benefits 
are based on earnings between the lower and upper earnings limits (described 
below). In the long term, under current rules, the pension received  by  mem- 
bers of  SERPS with a full contribution record will be 20 percent of  average 
reckonableS earnings over their working life, revalued in line with average earn- 
ings to retirement age. 
The upper earnings limit is adjusted in line with prices rather than earnings. 
The value of the SERPS pension will therefore decline relative to average earn- 
ings through time. 
As mentioned, about  17 percent of employees are contracted into SERPS, 
of  which about 65 percent are women. About 70 percent of those in SERPS 
earn less than f10,OOO a year. (Average full-time male earnings in the United 
Kingdom are f20,000 a year.) The self-employed do not qualify for SERPS. 
The projected cost of  SERPS is shown in table 3.2. 
3.1.3  Contributions 
Contribution rates are set at the time of the annual budget. There is a lower 
earnings limit (LEL) and an upper earnings limit (UEL), although employers 
pay contributions above the latter. These limits are adjusted annually in line 
with retail prices and in 1996-97  were f61.00 and f455 a week, respectively. 
The LEL is set at the rate of  the single person’s retirement  pension rounded 
5. Reckonable enmirigs are earnings between the lower and the upper earnings limits 103  The Pension System in the United Kingdom 
Table 3.2  Projected Cost of SERPS (Sbillion, 1994-95  prices) 
1994-95  2000-2001  2010-11  2020-21  2030-31  2040-41  2050-51 
1.9  4.2  8.4  10.9  12.0  10.2  9.9 
down to the nearest pound per week. The UEL is approximately 7.5 times the 
LEL. No contributions are paid if earnings are below the LEL. The rates for 
1996-97  are shown in table 3.3. 
The contracted-in rate is paid by or on behalf of members of SERPS. Those 
contracted out of  SERPS pay  lower contributions. In  1996-97,  this “con- 
tracted-out rebate” was 4.8 percent of earnings between the LEL and the UEL. 
It was reduced to 4.6 percent in April 1997,  following the government actuary’s 
regular five-year review of the rebate. Three percent is deducted from employ- 
ers’ contributions, and the rest (previously 1.8 percent, currently 1.6 percent) 
is deducted from employees’ contributions. 
It can be seen from table 3.3 that there is an “entry fee” of 51.22 for empioy- 
ees as soon as their income reaches f61  .OO per week. The marginal contribu- 
tion  rate  for  employees falls to  zero when  weekly  earnings exceed &455. 
Employers’ contributions are paid on all earnings once they reach E6 1  .OO  per 
week; that is, an increase in earnings from E60.00 to E61 .OO costs the employer 
E2.83. There are similar step increases as earnings move through the successive 
pay bands. An increase from 2209 to E210 costs the employer E7.79. 
National Insurance contributions (NICs) are also used to finance unemploy- 
ment benefits and a number of other benefits, including incapacity benefit and 
statutory maternity pay. In addition, about 11 percent of NIC receipts are paid 
Table 3.3  National Insurance Contribution Rates, 1996-97  (% NIC rate) 
Employees  Employers 
Contracted In  Contracted Out  Contracted Out 
1  St  1  St  Contracted  1  St 
Weekly Earnings  f61  Rest  f61  Rest  In  f61.00  Rest 
Below f61.00 (LEL)  0  ...  0  ...  .o  .o  ... 
f61.00-f  109.99  2  10  2  8.2  3.0  3.0  .O 
f 110-f  154.99  2  10  2  8.2  5  .O  5 .O  2.0 
f 155-f209.99  2  10  2  8.2  7.0  1.0  4.0 
f 2 10-f455  2  10  2  8.2  10.2  10.2  1.2 
Above f455 (UEL)  2  2  10.2  10.2 
b 
“10 percent of  earnings between f61  and f455; 0 percent on earnings over f455. 
b8.2  percent of  earnings between €61 and f455;  0 percent on earnings over f455. 
cThe contracted-out rebate (described in the text) is available only with respect to earnings between the 
LEL and the UEL. Employers’ NICs with respect to someone earning over the UEL are therefore 10.2 
percent of their earnings minus 3 percent of the difference between the LEL and the UEL. 104  Alan Budd and Nigel Campbell 
toward the financing of the National Health Service. The state pension scheme 
is contributory in the sense that entitlement to the basic state retirement pen- 
sion depends on a contribution record. However, there need be no direct rela- 
tion  between  the  payments  made  by  individuals  (or  their  employer)  and 
the basic pension received. This follows automatically from the fact that the 
pension is paid  at  a flat rate while  contributions  depend on earnings. Also, 
contributions are credited for those who are registered as unemployed or who 
receive certain social security benefits. As mentioned above, women can now 
receive credits for time spent caring for children. Employers’ contributions do 
not gain any entitlement, and it is possible to make employee contributions in 
the course of a year that do not count. Finally, those without a full contribu- 
tions record  (who will largely  consist of those who have earned below  the 
LEL) can claim means-tested  income  support that is greater than  the basic 
pension. 
The rather tenuous link between contributions and benefits has led Johnson 
and Stears (1996) to suggest that the contributory requirements should be abol- 
ished and replaced by entitlement based on residence. Successive governments 
have chosen to retain the contributory principle partly on the ground that re- 
ceipt of  the basic pension does not carry the stigma that may be attached to 
income support and partly because they like to emphasize the link between 
contributions and benefits. In some cases, the contribution requirement saves 
public expenditure since there will be some pensioners who receive less than 
the full basic pension but who will not be eligible for income support (e.g., 
because they have too much capital). It is also true that the contributory prin- 
ciple means that increases in contribution rates have in the past not been sub- 
ject to the same opprobrium as increases in income tax rates. 
3.1.4  The National Insurance Fund 
The National Insurance Fund (NIF) is one of eight funds and accounts used 
by the central government for its revenue and expenditure transactions. 
National  Insurance contributions  are paid  into the  NIF,  and  contributory 
benefits are paid from it. The main contributory benefits are the basic retire- 
ment pension, SERPS, unemployment benefit, incapacity benefit, and widow’s 
benefit. Entitlement to all these benefits is based to some extent on contribu- 
tions made.  In  addition, some NICs  are used  to fund  part  of  the  National 
Health Service. 
The fund operates  on a pay-as-you-go  basis, so contributions  by  current 
workers are used to pay current pensions. The NIF has been topped up with a 
supplementary payment from general taxation in most years since the NIF was 
set up in 1948-49. 
Any pay-as-you-go scheme that pays benefits to all pensioners from the start 
would initially  need  significant  financial  support. This was true of  the NIF, 
whose payments from general taxation averaged 34 percent of NIC revenue in 105  The Pension System in the United Kingdom 
its first three years. A lower proportion was needed thereafter, but the transfer 
from the general tax pool to the NIF was still part of the design of the system 
until 1989. This “Treasury supplement” was worth 18 percent of NIC revenue 
up to  1980-81,  was reduced steadily to 5 percent in 1988-89,  and then was 
abolished from 1989-90. 
As the NIF did not have a huge surplus by  1989, it is clear that the previous 
forty years of  Treasury supplements  effectively  subsidized the contribution 
rates (or allowed for more generous contributory benefits) over that period. 
There were no payments to the NIF from general taxation in the four years 
from  1989-90.  From  1993-94,  however, it became possible for a “Treasury 
grant” to be payable to the NIF if it appeared that its balance by the end of the 
year would be below one-sixth of  annual benefit expenditure. This Treasury 
grant was thus explicitly aimed at maintaining a working balance in the fund 
rather than (as with the Treasury supplement) implicitly subsidizing the contri- 
bution rate. The Treasury grant has been steadily reduced from 24 percent of 
NIC revenue in 1993-94  to under 5 percent in 1996-97. 
The NIF ran deficits in three of the four years (from 1989-90  to 1992-93) 
in which no Treasury supplements or grants were paid. Only in 1988-89, when 
the NIF surplus exceeded the Treasury supplement by E1.4 billion, and 1990- 
91, when there was an NIF surplus of El  .5 billion and no supplement or grant, 
has NIC revenue exceeded NIF expenditure. 
The overall picture, therefore, is of a pay-as-you-go scheme whose revenue 
has not fully covered its expenditure in all but two of the years since 1948. 
The transfer from general taxation needed has been significantly reduced over 
the years and is no longer built in as an implicit and permanent subsidy to the 
contribution rate. 
3.1.5  The Self-Employed 
In 1995, about 13 percent of those in work were self-employed. Unlike em- 
ployees, the self-employed are not required to make compulsory second-tier 
pension provision, and self-employment income does not give entitlement to 
SERPS.  The self-employed pay different (and generally lower) National Insur- 
ance contributions. 
Self-employed people with earnings above E3,430 a year pay a flat-rate con- 
tribution of  E6.05 a week. Those earning below E3,430 can opt to pay  the 
charge. These contributions give entitlement to the basic state retirement pen- 
sion. There is an additional contribution of 6 percent of profits between E6,860 
and E23,660 a year (the latter equals the UEL for employees; the former is 
rather higher than the LEL). 
Although there is no state second-tier provision for the self-employed, they 
se  eligible for tax relief on their personal pension contributions up to a cap. 
They do not, however, receive tax relief for pension contributions that are in- 
vested in their own business. 106  Alan Budd and Nigel Campbell 
3.1.6  Early Retirement 
Labor force participation  rates  in the United  Kingdom remain among the 
highest in Europe. But, since 1980, there has been a marked fall in the partici- 
pation  rates of  men in the last ten  years of  their  working life. In  1980, 90 
percent of men aged fifty-five to fifty-nine and 71 percent aged sixty to sixty- 
four were either working or looking for work. By 1994, those proportions had 
fallen to 74 and 52 percent, respectively. 
Many of those who retire early are eligible for occupational pensions. Those 
over fifty are able to use their personal pension fund to buy an annuity. They can- 
not, however, receive their basic state retirement pension or SERPS until they 
reach the state pension age (currently sixty-five for men and sixty for women). 
The unemployed receive National Insurance credits, which count toward en- 
titlement to  the basic state pension. Early  retirees  may be eligible for these 
credits.  People  under  sixty  would  have to  show  that  they  are available and 
looking for work to qualify for credits and (if applicable) unemployment bene- 
fits. Men over sixty receive automatic credits independently of availability for 
work, while women over sixty are already eligible for the state pension. 
3.1.7  SERPS-a  History 
SERPS was introduced by a Labour government in the 1975 Social Security 
Pensions Act,  which  came into force in  197K6  It added an earnings-related 
pension to the existing basic pension. 
As now, the scheme was based on contributions on reckonable earnings, that 
is, earnings between the LEL and the UEL. It originally provided a pension of 
a quarter of the individual’s average revalued reckonable earnings (as defined 
at the end of this paragraph).  Since one aim of  the act was to make the new 
pension  arrangements  mature  rapidly,  a  full  earnings-related  pension  was 
based on the best twenty years of earnings since SERPS began. Thus, anyone 
who was earning for twenty years or more from 1978 could get a full pension 
if his or her earnings were high enough. (By contrast, full entitlement to the 
basic  state pension  required,  for men, contributions  of  over 90 percent of  a 
normal working life, although again, at its introduction, there was an acceler- 
ated accrual rate for those working at that time.) Average revulued reckonable 
earnings, for the relevant years, were calculated by revaluing each year’s reck- 
onable earnings in line with the change in average earnings for the whole econ- 
omy between the original date and the retirement date. The pension was based 
on the average of the twenty best years. After retirement, the SERPS pension 
was to be indexed to prices. 
Contracted-out occupational pension schemes had to provide a guaranteed 
minimum pension (GMP) broadly equivalent to the SERPS pension. They also 
had to meet a requisite benejits test and therefore had, in effect, to have a higher 
6.  An account of earlier earningwelared state schemes is providcd in Blake (1995) 107  The Pension System in the United Kingdom 
accrual rate than SERPS. Those retiring from contracted-out schemes also had 
additional pension rights under SERPS, but the GMP was deducted from their 
SERPS entitlement. Since SERPS was indexed to prices but the GMP was not, 
SERPS  effectively  provided  some  indexation  for  those  in  occupational 
schemes. 
3.1.8  The 1985 Green Paper 
In June 1985,  the Conservative government published a green paper, Reform 
ofSocial Security (Secretary of State for Social Services 1985a). By that date, 
the bulk of  spending on benefits for pensioners  was still in the form of the 
basic pension. Less than  1 percent of expenditure resulted from the earnings- 
related additions, although this was due to rise significantly in later years. The 
single person’s basic pension was worth one-third the average take-home pay 
for a manual worker, and the pension for a married couple was worth half the 
average take-home pay for a manual worker. 
The green paper examined the implications  of the basic state pension and 
SERPS over the following fifty years. It showed that, if the basic pension were 
indexed to prices, its cost would increase by 40 percent over the following fifty 
years. If it were linked to earnings, its cost would almost treble. Over the same 
period, the ratio of National Insurance contributors to pensioners was expected 
to fall from 2.3 to  1.6. The green paper pointed out that the increased cost of 
the basic pension would benefit all pensioners equally. However, the case was 
different  for recipients  of  SERPS. Its earnings-related  nature meant that the 
newly retired would benefit  more than older pensioners. Also, half the extra 
cost would  result from payments to members of contracted-out  schemes (to 
provide indexation top-up to the GMP). The cost of SERPS (in 1985 prices) 
was expected to be about 224 billion in 2035, compared with a basic pension 
cost in 1985 of about El5 billion. 
The green paper pointed out that the peak of occupational pension scheme 
membership had been reached in the mid-1960s. There had been growth in the 
public sector, but coverage of the total workforce was still only about half. The 
earlier decline in private schemes was thought to have been partly caused by 
uncertainty about the future of pensions policy. But the new system had pro- 
duced little change. It was also believed that the complexities of contracting 
out discouraged companies from setting up their own schemes, partly because 
they had to match the standards of a defined-benefit scheme. 
The government believed that occupational and personal pensions were the 
right way to provide second-tier pensions. It argued that it was preferable for 
individuals to make provision for such pensions rather than to leave responsi- 
bility wholly to the state and to require taxes to be levied on the next genera- 
tion. It considered the following possibilities for change: 
Abolition of  SERPS without Replacement. This would restrict the role of the 
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grounds that some employers and employees might take too short term a view. 
It would perpetuate “two nations” of those with and without additional pen- 
sions. Those with only the basic state pension would too often have to fall back 
on means-tested benefits. 
A Restricted SERPS. This would restrict the scope and hence reduce the cost 
of the state scheme, without providing an alternative. Costs would be reduced 
by moves to change the period over which earnings were counted for entitle- 
ment; reduce the rate of  accrual; make occupational schemes responsible for 
their own inflation proofing; reduce the widows’ entitlement; increase the pen- 
sion age for women; and reduce the maximum earnings on which entitlement 
would be calculated. 
The green paper estimated that these latter changes could cut the eventual 
cost of the scheme by about half but that the changes would have essentially a 
negative effect: “It would make savings simply by reducing benefits. It would 
perpetuate the cumbersome structure of contracting out. It would do nothing 
to encourage employers to set up schemes or people to make extra provision 
through personal pensions” (Secretary of State for Social Services 1985a, par. 
1.38). It therefore proposed “a new partnership” between state provision and 
occupational and personal provision.  Its long-term goal was the position  in 
which the state provided  a basic pension for all and everybody also had an 
additional pension provided out of individual savings. 
The main  proposals for reform were  to leave the basic  state pension un- 
changed; to have men over fifty and women over forty-five continue under the 
existing  system; to honor  all existing  pension  entitlements  under  the  state 
scheme (in the form of eventual pension payments rather than a “recognition 
bond’); and to phase out SERPS and replace it with occupational and personal 
pension schemes. 
3.1.9  The 1985 Reforms 
Ultimately, the government decided not to phase out SERPS. In the white 
paper Reform of  Sociul Security: Programme forAction (Secretary of State for 
Social Services 1985b), published in December of the same year, it reported 
that a number of  organizations, including in particular the Confederation of 
British  Industry and the National Association  of Pension Funds, had argued 
that the scheme should be modified rather than replaced. Opposition by em- 
ployers partly reflected the perceived difficulties of matching the benefits of- 
fered by  SERPS for the lower paid. That, in turn, was due to the fixed-cost 
element of pension arrangements and to the low real returns on pension funds 
being achieved at the time. The government accepted these arguments on the 
basis that it could meet two objectives: to reduce the emerging cost of  SERPS 
and to ensure that conditions were created whereby individual pension provi- 
sion could expand. 
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green paper: Occupational pension schemes contracted out of the state scheme 
should be responsible for inflation-proofing GMPs up to 3 percent a year (pre- 
viously full indexation of  the GMP had been the responsibility of the state). 
SERPS pensions  should be based  on a lifetime’s earnings,  not  on the best 
twenty years. SERPS pensions should be calculated on 20 percent of earnings 
rather than 25 percent. And widows and widowers over sixty-five should be 
allowed to inherit half their spouse’s SERPS rights rather than the full amount. 
The net result of the changes was expected to nearly halve the cost of SERPS 
in 2033-34  from f25.5 billion to around El3 billion at 1985 prices. 
At the same time, the government announced a strategy to extend individual 
pension provision, to widen the choice for the individual, and to increase com- 
petition  among  pension  providers.  Seven  points  of  the  strategy  were  em- 
phasized:  (1) Contracted-out  occupational  schemes  could  include  defined- 
contribution schemes. The minimum contribution would be the contracted-out 
rebate.  The government  believed  that  this  would  encourage  industry-wide 
schemes. (2) An additional incentive in the form of an additional NIC rebate 
of 2 percent would be granted for five years to encourage employers to set up 
new schemes and individuals to set up personal pensions. (3) Membership in 
occupational pension schemes would no longer be compulsory for eligible em- 
ployees.  (4) Personal pensions, which had hitherto been limited to the self- 
employed,  would be  a vehicle  to allow employees to contract out. The full 
amount of  the NIC rebate plus the  2  percent incentive could be devoted to 
these so-called appropriate personal pensions (APPs). Contributions would be 
given tax relief. (5) Banks, unit trusts, and building societies as well as insur- 
ance companies would be able to provide personal pension savings schemes. 
(6) All occupational scheme members would have the right to pay additional 
voluntary contributions to boost their pensions. (7) Steps would be taken to 
provide investor protection for members of occupational schemes and the hold- 
ers of personal pensions. 
These changes were in addition to reforms that had already been introduced 
in the  1985 Social Security Act. The reforms had included protection  of  the 
pension rights of  early leavers from occupational pension schemes (by requir- 
ing them to be increased in line with prices up to 5 percent a year) and transfer 
rights (everyone leaving a scheme would have the right to a transfer value rep- 
resenting the value of deferred pension rights, which could be put in a new 
employer’s scheme or a single premium annuity or, under the new proposals, 
into a personal pension). 
It can be seen that the proposals were designed to encourage private provi- 
sion of second-tier pensions and to increase the “portability” of pensions. The 
extension of  personal pensions to employees would particularly favor those 
who expected to change jobs frequently and who tended  to be penalized by 
defined-benefit schemes. (The origin of occupational pensions was of course 
expressly designed to encourage long-term job tenure in  such industries as 
banking and insurance.) 110  Alan Budd and Nigel Campbell 
The government actuary (Secretary of State for Social Services 1985b, app.) 
estimated that the National Insurance contribution rate to pay for National In- 
surance benefits would be 15 percent by 2033, assuming that the basic pension 
was uprated in line with prices, compared with 18 percent if SERPS had been 
left unchanged. He commented that the new rate was one that future genera- 
tions should be able to afford. The changes to SERPS (along with other major 
reforms to the social security system) were introduced in the 1986 Social Secu- 
rity Act. 
The contracted-out rebate and the additional 2 percent incentive made per- 
sonal pensions a very good deal, particularly  for the young, since the rebate 
was the same for all ages, whereas the value of  the SERPS benefit given up 
increases with age. The Department of Social Security’s working assumptions 
were that about 500,000 people would take out personal pensions and that the 
number might ultimately reach 1.75 million. In fact, take-up reached 4 million 
by  the end of April  1990 and by  1993-94  had risen to 5.7 million, of whom 
about 4 million had rebates paid into their personal pensions. 
The National Audit Office (1990) commissioned a survey of the cost to the 
NIF of the rebate and the additional incentive for the period to April 1993. The 
survey estimated that the gross cost could be E9.3 billion and that the present 
value of the savings in payments of pensions was about E3.4 billion.  Hence, 
there was a net present value cost of E5.9 billion  (in  1988 prices). However, 
this  does not  take account of the step change  in personal  pension  take-up, 
which will have reduced state pensions yet further in the next century even 
after the end of the continuation of the 2 percent incentive. 
A further shadow has been cast over this episode by  the fact that some of 
those who joined personal pension schemes left occupational schemes that of- 
fered more favorable terms. Inquiries are still continuing into alleged cases of 
misselling of personal pensions during this period. 
3.1.10  The 1995 Pensions Act 
Further reforms to SERPS were introduced in the  1995 Pensions Act. The 
main purpose of the act was to provide additional safeguards for occupational 
pensions following the Maxwell affair7  and to equalize the state retirement age 
(which mainly affects the basic state pension) by increasing women’s retire- 
ment age from sixty to sixty-five. But, at the same time, changes were intro- 
duced to SERPS that further reduced its future cost. 
The 1986 Social Security Act had, as described above, enabled people to 
contract out of SERPS and buy APPs or join a defined-contribution  occupa- 
tional scheme. The 1995 Pensions Act is expected to reduce further the cost of 
7.  The late Robert Maxwell allegedly diverted pension fund assets, including those of Mirror 
Group Newspapers, in an attempt to restore solvency and liquidity to other companies under his 
control, thereby undermining the solvency of the occupational pension schemes and thus threaten- 
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Table 3.4  Reductions in SERPS Expenditure in 2030-31  as a Result of the 1995 
Pensions Act (&billion,  1994-95  prices) 
Equalization of pension age for men and women  1.9 
Annualization  2.5 
Abolition of guaranteed minimum pension  2.4 
SERPS in 2030-31  by E6.7 billion (in 1994-95  prices). Table 3.4 shows how 
the savings arise. 
The raising of the state pension age for women to sixty-five will be phased 
in over a ten-year period from 2010. It follows the European Court of Justice 
ruling that men and women must receive equal pension treatment. Annualiza- 
tion will effectively introduce an annual calculation of entitlement to SERPS, 
rather than a calculation at the point of retirement. This change prevents earn- 
ings below the LEL, in any year, generating SERPS entitlement. Under the old 
arrangements,  earnings  in  individual  years  were  uprated  by  the  growth  in 
whole-economy average earnings until retirement. The LEL at the retirement 
date, which had  since  1980 been  uprated  only in line with prices, was then 
subtracted from these revalued earnings. As a result, employees earning below 
the LEL were able to accumulate entitlement to SERPS. Even contracted-out 
employees (earning above the LEL) will have acquired around E2.80 a week 
worth of SERPS entitlement. 
The abolition of the GMP breaks the links between SERPS and contracted- 
out  pensions.  The  state  will  no  longer  guarantee  price  indexation  for 
contracted-out  pensions.  (The  act  has,  however,  required  private-sector 
schemes to index future pensions by inflation or by 5 percent a year, whichever 
is lower.) 
The 1995 Pensions Act also required that age-related rebates for contracted- 
out defined-contribution schemes, including personal pensions, be introduced 
from April  1997. This  was  aimed  at removing  the  excessive  incentive  for 
younger people to contract out and encouraging older people to do so. 
Table 3.5  shows how  the projected  future costs of  SERPS have changed 
since it was first introduced in  1975. The changes to the scheme in the  1986 
Social Security Act and the  1995 Pensions Act are estimated to reduce the 
public-sector  cost  of  SERPS in  2030  from E41  billion  to  El2 billion  (at 
1994-95  prices). These latest estimates imply that the original scheme would 
Table 3.5  Effect of Reforms to SERPS (&billion,  1994-95  prices) 
1994-95  2000-01  2010-11  2020-21  2030-31 
Original regime (1975-86)  1.8  4.2  12.0  25.0  41.0 
After 1986 Social Security Act  1.8  4.2  9.2  14.5  18.7 
After  1995 Pensions Act  1.8  4.2  8.4  10.9  12.0 112  Alan Budd and Nigel Campbell 
Table 3.6  Number of  Employees in Occupational Pension Schemes, 
1991 (millions) 
Private Sector  Private Sector  Public Sector 
Qpe  of  Scheme  Contracted Out  Contracted In  Contracted Out  Total 
Defined benefit  5.04  .56  4.20  9.80 
Defined contribution  .43  .47  .00  .90 
Total  5.47  I .03  4.20  10.70 
have been about &5 billion more expensive (in 1994-95  prices) than expected 
at the time of the 1986 act. 
The lower public-sector cost of SERPS does not mean that large numbers of 
people now have only one-third their previous second-tier pension provision. 
Instead, much of the reduction comes from more contracting out, which yields 
public expenditure savings without necessarily  affecting individuals’ future 
pension entitlement. 
3.2  Occupational and Personal Pensions 
In  1991 (the last year for which figures are available), about 68 percent of 
employees belonged to non-SERPS pension schemes. About one-third of these 
belonged to personal pension schemes. 
All personal pension schemes are defined-contribution schemes. Until the 
1986  legislation,  approved  occupational  schemes  had  to  be  of  the 
defined-benefit form. Occupational pension schemes remain predominantly of 
this type. The position in  1991, as described in  Disney (1995), is shown in 
table 3.6. 
Some employers have expressed interest in shifting from defined-benefit to 
defined-contribution schemes now that they are permitted to do so and still be 
contracted out.* This interest may be partly based on the view that defined- 
contribution  schemes  are  less  risky  for  employers  than  defined-benefit 
schemes. However, as the table shows, 90 percent of employees in private- 
sector contracted-out occupational schemes were in defined-benefit schemes 
in 1991, and the following account is mainly based on schemes of this type. 
Defined-benefit schemes are typically based on actual final salaries (or some 
average of final years’ salaries). Employee contribution rates payable in 1991 
are shown in table 3.7. 
It can be seen that a contribution rate of 5-7  percent is typical, although a 
significant number of private-sector employees (typically in the financial sec- 
tor) are in noncontributory schemes. Contributions by employers-for  funded 
schemes-are  based on actuarial estimates and can therefore vary from year 
to year according to the performance of the investment funds. The contracting- 
8. Disney and  Stears (1996) discuss the  moves between defined-benefit and defined-contr- 
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Table 3.7  Number of Members of Defined-Benefit Schemes Contributing 
Various Percentages  of Salary (thousands) 
Private Sector 
% of Salary  Contracted Out  Public Sector 
Under 2 
2 and under 3 
3 and under 4 
4 and under 5 
5 and under 6 
6 and under 7 


















out  arrangements  impose minimum requirements  on occupational  schemes. 
The  requirements  correspond  approximately  to  the  benefits  provided  by 
SERPS, which can in turn be linked to the contracted-out rebate (currently 4.8 
percent but to be reduced to 4.6 percent in 1997). Most occupational schemes 
are considerably more generous than this and provide combined contribution 
rates that are equivalent to up to 15 percent of total salary. It should be empha- 
sized that, in the United Kingdom, unlike in some continental European coun- 
tries, employers’ contributions  (as well as those made by employees) are ex- 
plicit and placed in a separately identifiable fund. They are not simply recorded 
as a reserve. 
Pensions are essentially subject to “expenditure  tax” treatment. Contribu- 
tions by employers and employees are tax free (subject to Inland Revenue lim- 
its), and returns on invested funds are also free of tax. Pensions in payment are 
taxable, but a tax-free lump sum may be withdrawn on retirement. The lump 
sum may be up to 1  Y2 times final salary or 25 percent of the accumulated fund 
for a personal pen~ion.~ 
Benefits vary from scheme to scheme. In the private sector, the normal re- 
tirement  age for men, and now for women following  the implementation  of 
equal treatment, is predominantly sixty-five. In the public sector, more than 50 
percent of  employees have a normal  retirement  age of  sixty or younger.  In 
existing private-sector schemes, the normal retirement  age for 50 percent of 
women  is sixty. Following  the  1995 Pensions Act, schemes must  treat men 
and women equally.  In private-  and public-sector  schemes, the accrual rate 
is typically one-eightieth per year for schemes that provide a pension and an 
additional lump sum and one-sixtieth  for those that provide only a pension. 
(Since part of a pension-only scheme can be converted to a lump sum, the two 
systems of  benefit are more or less equivalent.) Thus, after forty years’ service 
in the same scheme, members of a typical defined-benefit scheme retire with a 
9.  The pension fund industry argues that lump sum treatment is not as generous as it seems 
since fund accruals are given tax relief only at the lower rate of  income tax rather than members’ 
marginal tax rate. 114  Alan Budd and Nigel Campbell 
Belgium  29 
Canada  9 
France  5 
Germany  3 
Table 3.8  Defined-Benefit Schemes and Benefits Payable on Death in 
Service (thousands) 
Benefit Payable  Private Sector  Public Sector  Total 
Japan  14 
New Zealand  34 
United Kingdom  27 
United States  4 
None  10  ...  10 
Lump sum  5,540  4,050  9,590 
Refund of  contributions  2,870  1,020  3,890 
Pension to surviving spouse  5,450  4,200  9,650 
Pension to surviving children  4,110  4,200  8.3 10 
If unmarried, pension to a nominated person  1.870  750  2,620 
Nores: Lump sum is subject to a maximum of  four times annual salary if  tax relief is to be pro- 
vided. Schemes may appear under more than one category. 
pension of two-thirds of their final salary (part of which may be converted to a 
lump sum). 
Table 3.8 shows the benefits payable on death in service. Since there are 10.7 
million members of pension schemes, it can be seen that almost all members 
are entitled to a lump sum and/or a pension for the surviving spouse on death 
in service. 
Since the  1986 Social Security  Act,  members  of  occupational pension 
schemes have been able to transfer their accrued pension rights to another oc- 
cupational scheme or to a personal pension. 
Large schemes (i.e., those with more than five thousand members) are usu- 
ally self-administered, with the funds invested by their own investment manag- 
ers or an insurance company. Smaller schemes are usually insured schemes. 
By international standards, there are few restrictions on the types of invest- 
ment allowed funded occupational schemes. There are, for example, no limits 
on the proportions devoted to investment in equities or in overseas securities. 
There are limits on self-investment, and schemes cannot provide loans to mem- 
bers or on residential property. As table 3.9 shows, the United Kingdom has a 
high proportion of private-sector pension funds invested in overseas equities. 
3.2.1  Personal Pensions 
Information  on personal  pensions  is difficult to extract  and analyze  (see 
Johnson, Disney, and Stears 1996, chap. 5). It is estimated that, in  1991, 24 
percent of employees had contracted-out personal pensions. The only invest- 
ment in about three-fifths of these personal pensions was the rebate, equal to 
the contracted-out rebate together with any related incentives, which is paid 
Table 3.9  Percentage of Pension Funds Held in Foreign Assets, 1993 115  The Pension System in the United Kingdom 
into the scheme by the Department of Social Security. For young individuals in 
particular, a rebate-only pension should provide a better pension than SERPS. 
Personal pensions are available from a number of providers. These providers 
are mainly insurance companies, although building societies, unit trusts, and 
other financial organizations are permitted to administer pensions (at least up 
to retirement). As with occupational schemes, there are relatively few restric- 
tions on investments. 
Protected rights from appropriate personal pensions are now available from 
age fifty for both men and women. In general, proceeds from personal pension 
funds must be used to purchase an annuity. Recent changes in legislation have 
increased the individual’s freedom of choice between alternative annuity sup- 
pliers. They have also allowed the purchase of an annuity to be deferred until 
age seventy-five (with upper and lower limits on the sums that can be with- 
drawn up to that point). 
Personal pensions receive the same tax privileges as occupational pensions. 
3.2.2  Annuities 
In the United Kingdom, people “annuitizing”  any individual pension  sav- 
ings will normally stay with the insurance provider or, on occasion, take advan- 
tage of any “open market option” to withdraw their accumulated fund and pur- 
chase the annuity from a different insurer. Any penalty  is usually relatively 
small (and, where there is a change of insurer, is presumably more than offset 
by the better terms offered by the annuity provider). This market is at present 
unaffected by contracted-out appropriate personal pensions as these have been 
concentrated at younger ages. The effect of these on the annuity market will 
not be evident for about twenty years. 
Income withdrawals from a personal pension  fund prior to purchasing  an 
annuity has generally been limited to those with relatively large pension  sav- 
ings. One reason for this is that such people are in a better position to under- 
stand and accept the risks involved in betting against the investment market 
and their individual mortality, But it is also true that the expense charges ap- 
pear to be relatively  high and would be an onerous burden on smaller pen- 
sions savings. 
One particular aspect of the uncertainty over the date of annuity purchase is 
selection, that is, individuals and/or the insurance companies trying to opt for 
arrangements that prove to be (or at least seem likely to be) most beneficial to 
them. This can reduce the validity of detailed historical analysis looking solely 
at what has happened in the annuity market before, although, as relevant data 
become available, proper allowance can be made for such options. 
Insurance companies could aim to select people in the hope that they would 
die quickly. In a perfect market, another company would offer higher pensions 
at retirement  to such “poorer lives.” It is worth  noting  that some insurance 
companies in the United Kingdom offer enhanced pensions to such “impaired” 
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proach beyond the very ill. They intend to offer annuities that pay  more to 
those with medical conditions that are more likely to cause an early death (obe- 
sity, high cholesterol levels, high blood pressure, and diabetes) but whose con- 
ditions are not life threatening. 
Indexed annuities are widely available in the U.K. market. 
In summary, the U.K. pension annuity market is well developed and on a 
sound actuarial basis, with the result that the scope for selection is very re- 
stricted. It is only in newer aspects, such as perhaps income withdrawal, where 
statistical experience is lacking, although it is possible to use the data available 
to make reasonable assumptions about the potential effect on both those taking 
up such options and, equally important, those not doing so. 
3.3  Distribution of Pensioner Incomes 
Average pensioner incomes have risen by  about 50 percent in real terms 
since 1979. Higher incomes from occupational pensions and from investments, 
both of which have more than doubled, account for most of this increase. Pen- 
sioners' earnings from employment have fallen somewhat, while state pensions 
plus benefits have gone up. Table 3.10 shows how the mean income from each 
source, adjusted for the falling proportion of  pensioners who are single, has 
changed since 1979.'" (The raw figures show even higher average real increases 
in incomes.) 
The increases in occupational pension and investment income reflect both 
higher real amounts on average and a bigger proportion of pensioners receiving 
these types of  income. Seventy-three percent of pensioners had some invest- 
ment income in  1993, up from 62 percent in  1979. The average amount in- 
creased by  88 percent over the same period. The proportion receiving occupa- 
tional pensions rose by nearly half (from 43 to 62 percent), and the average 
occupational pension paid increased by 63 percent. 
This increase in average incomes has been accompanied by a widening of 
the distribution of pensioners' incomes, as it has for the population of working 
age. However, table 3.11 shows that real incomes have increased significantly 
for all quintiles of the distribution. 
Fewer pensioners are now at the bottom of the distribution of all household 
incomes. The bottom quintile of the income distribution contained 25 percent 
of all pensioners in  1992-93, compared to 47 percent in  1979. 
3.4  Notes toward an Assessment 
The main focus of this paper is on description rather than evaluation. As 
already discussed, the main features of the U.K. system are the modest level 
10. The material on the distribution of pensioner incomes comes from Department of  Social 
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Table 3.10  Average Pensioner Incomes 
% Real Increase, 
1979"  1993'  1979-93 
Gross income  113.40  166.70  47 
Of which: 
State pension plus benefits  69.20  89.40  29 
Occupational pension  18.20  40.90  I25 
Investment income  12.30  26.70  117 
Earnings  13.10  9.20  -30 
Other income  .70  SO  -  25 
"f  per week, July  1993 prices. 
of the basic state pension, the encouragement of private-sector schemes for the 
provision  of  second-tier pensions,  and reduced  entitlements  under  the  state 
earnings-related second-tier system. This section discusses some aspects of the 
economic  consequences  of  the  U.K.  system. Typically, the  relevant  conse- 
quences are effects on savings, including public finances, and effects on labor 
supply, in terms of retirement and work/leisure choices during employment. 
A common element in assessing these consequences is the rate of  return on 
pension contributions. For example, Feldstein ( 1996) argues that contributions 
to the federal system are in effect a tax since the implied returns are lower than 
those available in private schemes. The following subsection discusses some 
calculations with respect to the U.K. system. We do not discuss labor supply 
effects, a discussion of which can be found in Dilnot et al. (1994). 
3.4.1  Rates of Return 
As Samuelson (1958) has shown, the return on a pay-as-you-go  earnings- 
related scheme depends on the growth of the working population and of aver- 
age earnings. In the United Kingdom, under current policy the basic state pen- 
sion is fixed in real terms, whereas contributions  are related  to earnings. It 
follows that the return on contributions will be different for different cohorts. 
In addition, since benefits are flat rate, whereas contributions are earnings re- 
Table 3.11  Distribution of Pensioners' Incomes 
O/o Real Increase, 
1979"  1993a  1979-93 
Mean  98.20  148.55  51 
10th percentile  54.40  67.30  24 
30th percentile  63.40  86.10  36 
Median  69.40  98.50  42 
70th percentile  86.30  142.40  65 
90th percentile  165.30  262.40  59 
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lated, there is a redistributional  element in the basic state scheme. (However, 
as Dilnot et al. [  19941 point out, the effect is offset by the greater longevity of 
the higher paid.) 
Disney and Whitehouse (1993a) estimated rates of return for the state pen- 
sion scheme as a whole. Their results-reproduced  in table 3.12-show  that 
the real rate of return on state pensions will be negative for men retiring after 
2020. (The returns will be higher for women than for men.) 
These results  precede the  1995 Pensions Act, which reduced  both future 
benefits and contributions, and whose net effect on the rate of return was there- 
fore unclear. 
Disney and Whitehouse (1993b) also attempted to estimate the effect of con- 
tracting out of SERPS on the above analysis. They believe that those contracted 
out may have an intergenerational rate of return 0.5-1  percent higher than those 
who remain contracted in. 
The reason  for these low estimated rates of return  is that the basic  state 
pension is assumed to be fixed in real terms. Current employees are paying for 
pensions that are higher (relative to average real earnings) than those that they 
will  receive  when  they  in turn  retire.  This effect adds to the  normal effect 
whereby  rates of  return for successive cohorts fall as state pension schemes 
mature. 
Blake (1994) has estimated the rate of return from SERPS and from a typical 
contracted-out defined-benefit occupational scheme. For the first twenty years, 
the real rate of return from SERPS was 6.7 percent a year, about twice the 3.3 
percent from the occupational scheme. This reflected the generosity of SERPS 
when it was initially  set up, not because SERPS paid a very high pension- 
it paid 25 percent of the best twenty years’ earnings, usually well below the 
occupational equivalent-but  because contributions into SERPS were com- 
paratively low and particularly benefited those close to retirement. 
After the 1985 reforms, the real rate of return on SERPS fell from 6.7 per- 
cent per annum to 1.7 percent. The 1995 Pensions Act reduced it yet further, 
to 1.2 percent per annum. Thus, the real return on SERPS varies between 6.7 
percent (for those who retire before 1999) and 1.2 percent (for those who will 
retire after 2030). 
The rate of  return  on SERPS will  affect not just savings (for those who 
remain  members).  It  will  also  affect  the  decision  on  whether  to join  the 
Table 3.12  Intergenerational Real Rates of Return (% per annum) 
Cohort  2nd  8th 
Retiring In  Mean  Decile  Median  Decile 
2000  I .o  .5  .o  2.2 
2010  .2  -.I  .I  .5 
2020  -  .9  -.I  -  1.2  -.5 
2025  -  .7  -  .5  -  .9  -.8 119  The Pension System in the United Kingdom 
scheme. As described earlier, the choice was complicated by the special tempo- 
rary incentives to leave the scheme and by the fact that the contracted-out re- 
bate was the same for all ages. That particularly encouraged the younger em- 
ployees to leave. Optimal  strategies that involve leaving  and then  rejoining 
SERPS are described in Dilnot et al. (1994). The contracted-out rebate is, as 
of April 1997, age related, drastically reducing this incentive to switch into and 
out of SERPS. 
It is clear that contributions to the basic state pension, particularly  for the 
higher paid, are in effect a form of taxation and can therefore give rise to dead- 
weight costs of the type described in Feldstein (1996). The position on SERPS 
is rather more complicated since employees are able to contract out into a pri- 
vate scheme, including personal pensions. If those who remain members are 
acting rationally, they must believe that the returns on contributions to SERPS 
are at least as good as those in a private pension scheme (for an equal contribu- 
tion). Since most of those who have remained in SERPS are among the lower 
paid,  it is reasonable to believe that they are indeed acting rationally. It is, 
however, possible that the element of compulsion causes them to contribute 
more to pension schemes than they would choose freely. 
3.4.2  Macroeconomic Effects 
This section provides  a preliminary  assessment of the extent to which the 
current system and changes to it over the past twenty years have affected pri- 
vate and public savings. 
The introduction of SERPS in 1978 extended earnings-related pensions, on 
a generous basis for older employees, to a wider section of the population than 
had previously had access to them. Since it was a pay-as-you-go  system and 
was additional to the basic state pension, one might have expected it to replace, 
at least at the margin, individual savings for retirement and thereby to have 
reduced personal-sector savings. As Feldstein (1996) has pointed out, the ex- 
tent of displacement will depend, among other things, on the relative returns on 
the state scheme and on private-sector schemes. As already described, Blake’s 
calculations  suggest  that  the  return  on  SERPS, particularly  for those  ap- 
proaching retirement, was significantly higher than the return available on oc- 
cupational pension schemes. This reinforces the view that personal savings are 
likely to have fallen as a result of the introduction of SERPS. 
The same arguments would suggest that the subsequent reductions in the 
benefits available from SERPS would have raised personal-sector savings for 
those who remained  members  of  the  scheme. This effect should have been 
reinforced by those who left SERPS and moved to personal pensions, which 
are funded defined-contribution schemes. 
Blake (forthcoming) has made a preliminary  study of  whether changes in 
pension wealth  can explain movements  in the personal-sector  savings ratio. 
Using data from 1949 to 1994, he finds a significant negative relation between 
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seems to have lowered the personal-sector  savings ratio, and the subsequent 
reforms seem to have raised it. He finds no significant effects on savings from 
changes in basic state pension wealth but a significant effect from the real rate 
of  return on the basic  state pension. The freezing of  the real  value  of pen- 
sions-which  was a change from the previous policy and which reduced the 
real rate of return-thus  raised the personal sector’s savings ratio. 
In addition to the effect on discretionary private savings, we can ask whether 
the changes in policy had any effect on public-sector  savings. At the time of 
the introduction of  SERPS, the total National Insurance contribution rate for 
contracted-in employees was raised from 14% percent to  16% percent. There 
was also a 2 percent surcharge, introduced as a fiscal measure. Thus, the in- 
creased flow of revenue could have been used to raise public-sector  savings. 
However, there are reasons for believing  that this is unlikely to be the case, 
although it is difficult to define the counterfactual. The United Kingdom sets 
its fiscal policy in relation to the public-sector borrowing requirement (PSBR), 
which is a cash-flow measure. Its policy does not take explicit account of con- 
tingent liabilities such as future pension payments. Thus, it will not have re- 
duced its budget  deficit (or increased its surplus) to allow for higher future 
payments under SERPS. In practice, the increased current revenue from higher 
National Insurance contributions will have been used to finance higher public 
spending or cuts in other taxes. 
Since 1988, the government’s fiscal objective has been a zero PSBR when 
the economy is at its trend  level. Thus, the SERPS reforms, which reduced 
revenue flows, will not have led to a fall in public savings. 
Blake does, however, find positive effects on savings from both occupational 
and personal pension wealth. Thus, it appears that the favorable tax treatment 
provided to these schemes has raised private savings and, given the exogenous 
nature of public-sector savings, will have raised total savings. 
The fact that income support, which is a means-tested benefit, is higher than 
the basic state pension is likely to cause some discouragement of savings for 
the lower paid. There is in effect a 100 percent marginal tax rate on income 
from savings between the basic state pension  and income support. Since the 
gap between the two is between 6 and 9 percent, the disincentive effects could 
be significant (see Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1995), although this will be 
offset by  the requirement  for all employees earning over E61.00 a week to 
make second-tier provision. Approximately  17 percent of pensioners receive 
income support. 
3.5  Proposals for Reform 
If the present system is maintained, the real value of the basic state pension 
will remain constant and hence fall relative to average earnings. At the same 
time,  the  value  of  the  SERPS pension  and  of  the compulsory  element  of 
contracted-out pensions will also fall relative to average earnings. If the real 121  The Pension System in the United Kingdom 
value of income support is also held constant, the increased level of entitlement 
to earnings-related schemes should reduce the need for payments of income 
support to pensioners. However, those pensioners with  no or only a small 
amount of earnings-related pension will have a low level of entitlement relative 
to average earnings in the longer term. 
This expected outcome is consistent with  the then Conservative govem- 
ment's approach to public expenditure and to individual choice and is consis- 
tent with the Beveridge approach to pensions. An  adequate level of  income 
(but low relative to earnings) will be available to pensioners, mainly through 
the contributory basic state pension. Compulsory second-tier provision pro- 
vided either by  the state or by the private sector will provide a fairly modest 
earnings-related pension. Beyond that, the choice will be up to individuals and 
employers, assisted by  tax incentives. The public-sector cost of pensions will 
fall relative to GDP, and, for given demographics, National Insurance contribu- 
tion rates will be reduced. 
A more radical application of this approach might raise questions as to why 
there is any compulsory second-tier provision at all and why such provision 
should still involve, at least to some extent, the public sector. However, most 
comment on pensions focuses on rather different questions. In  particular, it 
draws attention to the continued reliance on income support of  a significant 
proportion of  pensioners  and  argues that  the  compulsory element  of  the 
second-tier pension is inadequate. 
Suggested changes to the basic state pension include restoring the basic state 
pension to 20 percent of average male earnings and uprating it thereafter in 
line with average earnings. Such a move would be costly and would bring little 
benefit to the poorest pensioners, who are already entitled to income support. 
An alternative proposal is to concentrate the benefit of  the basic pension on 
the least well off by  increasing the benefit earned by  lower-paid contributors 
and reducing the benefit earned by  higher-paid contributors. Schemes of this 
type would achieve a significant effect only after many years. They have been 
criticized on the grounds that they would be highly complex, would undermine 
the contributory principle, and could have unfavorable effects on incentives. 
3.5.1  An Assured Pension 
The Retirement Income Inquiry (RII)" proposed a new minimum pension 
guarantee, provided to all people over state pension age as of right. It would 
be specifically designed to provide an adequate level of income for those who 
do not have  sufficient income from other sources. It proposed the name As- 
sured Pension. 
The assessed income would disregard all assets but would take into account 
11. The Retirement Income Inquiry, under the chairmanship of Sir John Anson, was set up by 
the National Association of  Pension Funds. The inquiry was completely independent, and mem- 
bers served in an individual capacity. Their proposals are set out in Retirement  Income Inquiry 
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other pension income and other income from savings (with a small disregard). 
The withdrawal of the assured pension would be tapered. The RII did not pro- 
pose a specific rate at which withdrawal would be tapered but argued that some 
degree was essential. All those receiving an income-related pension under the 
assured pension  would qualify automatically for means-tested benefits, such 
as the housing benefit. 
The RII did not make a specific proposal about the level of the assured pen- 
sion although that would be critical in determining both the cost and the funda- 
mental nature of the overall scheme. It illustrated the costs of schemes that, at 
age sixty-five, would provide a weekly pension for a single person of E65.00 
(approximately  the current levcl  of  income support), E73.50 (20 percent  of 
average male earnings), f80.00, and f  120 (approximately one-third of average 
male earnings). The costs are shown in table 3.13. 
In its least costly form, the assured pension (with no taper) is much the same 
as the present system except for increasing the take-up of income support and 
allowing extra disregards. If  (as the RII proposes) there are changes to  the 
second-tier system that improve private provision of pensions, the introduction 
of an assured pension  should not involve any increase in costs beyond those 
outlined in table 3.13. 
The RII proposed that the assured pension should be financed from general 
taxation, apart from the basic pension, which would continue to be met from 
the National Insurance Fund. If the basic pension continues to be indexed to 
prices rather than earnings, it will provide a decreasing proportion of the as- 
sured pension (and of pensioners’ incomes in general). 
The RII argues that the assured pension  is a more effective way  of using 
money to provide an adequate minimum retirement income than proposals to 
increase  the value  of  all pensions.  This is part of  the  general debate about 
means testing versus universal provision. 
3.5.2  Second-Tier Provision 
Compulsory second-tier provision for employees is currently either provided 
through SERPS or requires, in effect, contributions of 4.8 percent of earnings 
between the LEL and UEL to be paid into an approved occupational or per- 
sonal pension scheme. 
Table 3.13  Additional Costs of an Assured Pension (Ebillion per year) 
Amount per Week, Single Person (Couple) 
E65.00  E73.50  €80.00  €120 
Withdrawal Rate  (€104)  (f117.60)  (€128)  (€192) 
100 percent (no taper)  I .0  2.6  4.6  17.2 
75 percent  I .2  3 .O  5.4  19.7 
50 percent  1.8  4.0  6.8  22.9 123  The Pension System in the United Kingdom 
The argument for compulsory second-tier provision may rest partly on the 
view that individuals are not the best judges of their own savings decisions. A 
more compelling argument may be that it reduces the need for individuals to 
rely on (noncontributory) state support. Frank Field M.P. in particular has ar- 
gued for the extension  of  compulsory  earnings-related  schemes  (see Field 
1995; and Field and Owen 1994).  He is strongly opposed to means-tested ben- 
efits, which, he argues, “penalise all those values which make strong, vibrant 
communities” (Field 1995, 10). He proposes a two-part social security system. 
Public welfare provision would be administered by an independent stakehold- 
ers’ insurance corporation that would, in due course, set contribution and bene- 
fit rates subject to a veto by  the chancellor of  the Exchequer. Contributions 
would be earnings related for all employees, including part-time workers and 
others below  the  LEL. The government would  make contributions for the 
lowest-paid workers, but there would be a clear distinction between the redis- 
tributive function of the scheme (based on taxation) and its savings function 
(based on graduated contributions). 
There would also be a compulsory second-tier system operating through a 
stakeholders’ private pension  corporation. All employees and self-employed 
persons would be compelled to become members of a private pension scheme. 
The board of the corporation would set the rate of contributions for employee 
and employer. Contributions would start at a modest level and would be pro- 
gressively raised. 
Many of Field‘s proposals were incorporated in the report of the Commis- 
sion on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion in a Free Society (Dahrendorf et 
al. 1995). 
The RII concluded that a compulsory second tier is needed in order to avoid 
excessive costs to the taxpayer of providing an adequate minimum retirement 
income. It proposed that the minimum level of contributions to the second tier 
should be sufficient and its coverage wide enough to ensure that, in the future, 
almost all the retired population will have adequate incomes and will not re- 
quire additional state support to achieve the minimum level of income guaran- 
teed by the assured pension. If the assured pension is related to average earn- 
ings, and if the basic state pension remains fixed in real terms, the level of 
contributions to the second tier will need to rise through time. 
Beyond  that,  the  RII  argued that  the  level  of  contributions to pensions 
should be  a  matter of  personal  choice. It proposes  that  SERPS should be 
phased out and replaced by a funded national pension scheme. It would be a 
defined-contribution scheme, with funds invested in a well-balanced portfolio 
of investments. The scheme would be compulsory for those not in a scheme 
meeting minimum requirements, but it would be open for anyone to join, and 
members could contribute above the minimum required level. Tax relief would 
be given to contributions and to income earned within the scheme, as is cur- 
rently the case with occupational and personal pensions.  On retirement, the 
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national pension scheme would be particularly  suitable for low-paid and mo- 
bile workers and those in small firms. It also believes that it would keep admin- 
istrative costs low. It assumes that the national pension scheme would not be 
identified as part of public expenditure. 
Employers  and employees would be required to provide between them at 
least a minimum contribution to an approved scheme or to the national pen- 
sion scheme. The employee would exercise the choice. The committee pro- 
poses that the minimum combined contribution should be set at the current 
contracted-out  rebate  of  4.8  percent.  Compulsory  contributions  would  be 
subject to an upper earnings limit, set at about the same level as the current 
UEL. There would also be a lower limit, which could be fixed at about the 
current LEL. 
The committee proposes that rights already accrued under SERPS would be 
preserved and the eventual SERPS pensions financed on a pay-as-you-go basis 
from the National Insurance Fund. It also recommends that anyone within fif- 
teen years of pension age should be allowed to remain in SERPS if they wish. 
Their compulsory  contributions  would  be  paid  into the National  Insurance 
Fund. Contracted-out rebates would cease. The new NIC rate would be  set 
0.5-0.7  percent  higher  than the current contracted-out rate, 4.3-4.1  percent 
lower than the contracted-in rate. 
If  the minimum contribution remains at 4.8 percent, the effect on contribu- 
tions for employees and employers would be that those already contracted out 
would pay a higher NIC rate and existing contributions to an occupational or 
personal pension; that those leaving SERPS would pay a lower NIC rate and a 
minimum of 4.8 percent to their new funded scheme; and that those remaining 
in SERPS would pay a lower NIC rate but would pay 4.8 percent toward their 
SERPS pensions. 
Compulsory contributions to the  second tier should be increased through 
time to constrain the public-sector cost of  paying the assured pension. This 
could presumably be done through increases in the compulsory contribution 
rate. The committee recommends that pensions should be required to provide 
at least limited price indexation and should include survivors’ benefits. They 
also recommend that men and women should get equal pension rates for equal 
contributions within the compulsory element. 
3.6  Privatization and the U.K. Experience 
In this final section, we consider briefly, in the context of this collection of 
papers, the extent to which privatization has played a part in the development 
of the U.K. pensions system. 
It is clear, from the other studies, that the key elements in the reforms else- 
where are privatization and funding, with the funds being invested in produc- 
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tization of  activities formerly run by  the public sector, it has not generally 
counted its changes to the pension system as part of this process. Richard Dis- 
ney has commented that the first major change in the U.K. pensions system in 
the postwar period went in the opposite direction. The introduction of SERPS, 
and its predecessors, was an attempt to supplement the private sector’s occupa- 
tional pension schemes by extending second-tier pensions to a wider range of 
employees. It did not involve nationalization of the existing private schemes, 
but, at the time of its introduction, it provided a generous alternative, particu- 
larly for those close to retirement. In addition, it provided a potential supple- 
ment to all private-sector schemes by providing postretirement indexation at a 
time when most private schemes did not do so. 
One can say that SERPS added an unfunded earnings-related public scheme 
to the funded private-sector pension schemes. 
The reforms  since  1985 certainly  qualify  as a move to privatization  and 
funding.  Those  who  have  left  SERPS  have  moved  from  public-sector  to 
private-sector  schemes.  They  have  also  moved  from  unfunded  to  funded 
schemes that are largely invested in equities. About half the employees who 
were members of  SERPS in 1985 have left the scheme. In addition, new en- 
trants to the labor force may join occupational pension schemes, if they are 
available, or can start personal pension schemes, using the contracted-out re- 
bate plus possible supplements from employers or employees. These schemes 
are funded. 
It remains true that all employees  and the  self-employed (with  earnings 
above a lower  limit)  must  belong  to the  basic  state contributory  pension 
scheme, which is pay as you go. However, under current policy, the value of 
the basic pension is fixed in real terms. The public-sector component of pen- 
sion incomes is therefore withering away relative to private, funded provision. 
There is clearly an issue of whether this system too should be privatized and 
funded. That would, in turn, raise questions about whether it should become 
earnings related or whether there should continue to be at least a flat-rate el- 
ement. 
There is  also the question of  whether  SERPS  should  be  privatized  and 
funded. That would be a rather simpler matter than privatizing and funding the 
basic pension scheme. That was, in effect, the original proposal in 1985, but, at 
that time, the private sector was reluctant to accept responsibility for providing 
earnings-related pensions for the low paid and workers who moved often into 
and out of employment. 
Like other moves toward funded schemes, the United Kingdom’s reforms 
have had a transitional cost. Disney estimates that the switch to personal pen- 
sions may currently be reducing National Insurance Fund revenue by about &3 
billion a year (about 0.5 percent of GDP) and that to offset this an increase in 
contribution rates of up to 2 percentage points would be required. It is clear 
that current pensioners are not bearing this cost, nor are those who have con- 126  Alan Budd and Nigel Campbell 
tracted out of SERPS (except insofar as they share the general burden through 
higher National Insurance contributions or taxes). The &3  billion is being met 
by National Insurance contributors and/or taxpayers. 
In general, one can say that the modest public-sector cost of pension provi- 
sion in the United Kingdom does reflect a policy of privatization. Under cur- 
rent policies, funded private-sector schemes will provide an increasing propor- 
tion of retirement income. In the United Kingdom, by contrast with some other 
cases,  this  private provision-assisted  by  favorable tax  treatment-will  be 
largely voluntary rather than compulsory. Although employees are compelled 
to make pension provision (either in the state scheme or by investing in private 
pensions), there is less compulsion than there was before the reforms and sig- 
nificantly less than in many other industrial and developing countries. 
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Comment  Richard Disney 
Discussion 
Alan Budd and Nigel Campbell are to be congratulated on providing a clear 
and succinct account of the pension system in the United Kingdom, in particu- 
lar concerning its historical reform process as well as reform proposals now 
on the table. Unlike in Chile, there was no “clean” privatization of social secu- 
rity in the United Kingdom: just over two decades ago, the U.K. system was 
characterized by a flat social security pension augmented by welfare benefits, 
coupled to private pension plans covering 50 percent of the workforce. The 
1975 legislation saw the introduction of an additional social security pension 
scheme, the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), for most work- 
ers not covered by private pensions. Existing private pensions were brought 
into the social security system by  the means of  “contracting out”: company 
pension  schemes paid lower rates of contribution to the National Insurance 
Fund on behalf of their members and in turn took on responsibility for paying 
a guaranteed minimum pension (GMP) to their members in retirement in lieu 
of SERPS. 
This framework of contracting out was used as the basis for the partial priva- 
tization of the U.K.  social security system after the  1986 legislation, which 
had stemmed from a projection that the long-run costs of SERPS were unaf- 
fordable. Now, in exchange for sacrificing their SERPS entitlement, individu- 
Richard Disney is professor of economics at Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of 
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als could have their contracted-out rebate paid into an individual savings ac- 
count known as a personal pension. Such approved personal pension accounts 
(APPs) could be augmented by additional voluntary tax-relieved contributions. 
Around 25 percent of the workforce availed themselves of  the opportunity of 
establishing APP accounts between 1987-88  and 1994-95,  with a few choos- 
ing to leave company pension plans in order to do so. With the decline in the 
value of the flat basic pension charted by Alan Budd and Nigel Campbell and 
around 75 percent  of  the workforce  in  some form of  pension  plan or APP 
account, pensioners in the United Kingdom in the future will largely rely on 
private pensions for their income. 
Projections 
The effect of this reform process, described by Budd and Campbell, is sum- 
marized  in table 3C.1, which gives official projections of the future costs of 
providing social security in the United Kingdom. The table shows that, despite 
the decline in the support ratio of workers to pensioners from 2.1 at the turn 
of  the century  to just over  1.5 in 2050-51,  the required National  Insurance 
contribution rate of the pay-as-you-go social security program actually falls by 
over 4 percentage points. The authors describe how this “financing miracle” is 
achieved by the decline in the value of the basic pension, relative to earnings, 
the equalization of state pensionable age for men and women at sixty-five after 
2010-1 1, the projected cutbacks in the generosity of SERPS, and the increase 
in contracting  out of the social security program. They do not perhaps  give 
sufficient emphasis to this last point. Tax expenditures of lower National Insur- 
Table 3C.1  Future Trends in United Kingdom Support Ratio, Social Security 
Expenditure, and Contribution Rates 
1994-95  2000-2001  2010-11  2030-31  2050-51 
Basic pension”  26.9  29.8  33.6  41.9  42.3 
SERPS~‘  1.8  4.2  8.4  12.0  9.9 
Incapacity  benefitsd  6.3  5.7  6.3  6.9  6.5 
Other benefitss  2.5  2.6  2.4  3.0  2.9 
Total  39.9  42.2  50.8  63.8  61.7 
Contribution rate (%r  18.3  17.9d  17.5  17.4  14.1 
No. of pensioners‘  10.6  11.0  12.4  14.7  14.9 
No. of contributors‘  22.0  22.7  24.0  23.9  22.9 
Support ratio  2.06  2.06  1.94  I .63  1.54 
Source: National Insurunce  Fund ( 1995). 
5billion at 1994-95  prices. 
hIncluding widow’s benefits and other benefits. 
‘Joint contribution for contracted-in employees. 
”Assumed contracted-out rebate for the period from 1997-98  to 2001-2002  is 4.95 percent. 
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ance contributions to APP members are currently running at some &3  billion a 
year, and these rebates were a major reason for the rise in contribution rates 
and the deficit financing of the National Insurance Fund in the early 1990s. I 
calculate that the contribution rate required to finance social security is up to 
2 percentage points higher currently as a result and some 2 percentage points 
lower in the future also. In other words, the contribution rate would have re- 
mained roughly constant, at 16 percent of eligible earnings, from 1994-95  to 
2050-5  1 rather than falling by 4 percentage points, as indicated in table 3C. 1, 
had APPs not been introduced. 
Rates of Return 
Feldstein (1996) has pointed to the implicit deadweight loss arising from 
pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) financing of pensions when capital market returns ex- 
ceed the growth of the earnings base. Such a discrepancy might also provide a 
rationale for the  shift from SERPS to APPs in the  1980s and  1990s in the 
United Kingdom. Table 3C.2 shows that the United Kingdom does indeed ob- 
tain  an  excess  return  on full funding  over PAYGO  funding  of  around  6% 
percentage  points  annual  return.  Indeed,  my  calculations  in  Disney  and 
Whitehouse (1993) suggest that returns for men remaining in SERPS will actu- 
ally be negative in the future, providing a rationale for why so many young 
men not covered by company pension plans have purchased APPs. 
However, the “premium” of funded schemes should be qualified by consid- 
erations of risk and transactions costs. Figure 3C. 1 shows clearly that the per- 
formance of real returns of pension funds tends to fluctuate much more widely 
than  the  Samuelsonian  “return”  on PAYGO  funding. Table 3C.3 compares 
transactions costs on different types of pension plans and social security using 
Table 3C.2  U.K. Real Rates of Return 
Pension fund investment performance, 1979-94,  median funds real 
Growth of PAYGO earnings base, 1979-94,  annual growth of 
Memo items:‘ 
return*  8.5 percent per annum 
earnings billb  1.8 percent per annum 
Growth of  retail prices, 1979-94  6 percent per annum 
Growth of real earnings, 1979-94  2 percent per annum 
SERPS + BSP? men retiring 2000 (mean return)  1  .O  percent per annum 
SERPS + BSP, men retiring 2020 (mean return)  ~  .9 percent per annum 
”The median return obtained by  all the pension funds participating in  the Combined Actuarial 
Performance Services Ltd. sample. A “typical” fund will invest as follows: domestic equity, 60 
percent; foreign equity, 20 percent; other, 20 percent. Source: Bacon &Woodrow (1996). 
bSource: Economic Trends. 
‘For  contracted-out men, rates of return on BSP + GMP are some 0.5-1.0  percent higher. For 
women, rates of return on SERPS + BSP may be considerably higher. Source: For social security 
returns, see the text of  Budd and Campbell. 
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Table 3C.3  U.K. Pension Transactions Costs 
Social security pension: Administrative costs as % of expenditure”  1.2 
of expenditureb  5.1 
as % of fund value 
percent; lowest, 3.3 percent)  13.0 
10.2 
Occupational (company) pensions: “Expenses and miscellaneous expenditures” as% 
Personal pensions:‘ Average charges attached to a five-year monthly premium APP 
€200 per month, taken out 1 January 1993, retire at sixty-five (highest, 24.0 
One stand-alone premium (of €10,000) (highest, 14.7 percent; lowest, 4.3 percent) 
“Source:  The Government 5 Expenditure Plans. 
bSource:  Eighth Survey of  Occupational Schemes, 1987 (1991). 
‘These are based on plan charge structures (reported in Walford 1995),  applied to a projected APP 
given the above assumptions plus an assumed rate of return (10 percent per annum gross). Actual 
payouts (which may  incorporate differences  in plan performance) are also reported in Walford 
(1995). 
a comparable measure across plan types (for a discussion of the appropriate- 
ness of  this measure and other measures, see Mitchell, chap. 10 in this vol- 
ume). Social security pensions are by far the cheapest to operate, and the costs 
attached  to company  pension  plan  management  and to APPs should be re- 
garded as reducing returns by up to 50 and 150 basis points, respectively. Note, 
too, the extent of idiosyncratic plan risk as indicated by the spread of returns 
within APP plans and the fact that APP charging structures typically contain a 131  The Pension System in the United Kingdom 
lump sum element  that  should  discourage purchasers  with the very  lowest 
incomes. 
Who Are Approved Personal Pension Members? 
In any discussion of the privatization of U.K. social security, it is APP mem- 
bers who are of most interest. Unlike in Chile, individuals in the United King- 
dom can opt to remain in social security or to buy an APP, or to participate in 
a group plan, whether of the defined-benefit or the defined-contribution type, 
if  covered. The choice structure is a more complex version  of  the structure 
modeled  by  Gustman and Steinmeier  (chap. 8 in this volume). Although  it 
would  be possible to construct scenarios where individuals differed  in their 
degree of risk aversion and where utility maximization decisions “sorted” indi- 
viduals into different sectors (as in Brugiavini and Disney  1995), the choice 
between SERPS and an APP has been driven by the differential accrual struc- 
tures and the financial nexus (Disney and Whitehouse 1992). Thus, APP mem- 
bers are typically young (people aged under thirty constituted 66 percent of 
optants in 1987-88,  although that figure fell to 49 percent of the total in 1992- 
93) and male (68 percent of members in 1987-88,63  percent in 1992-93).  The 
median contribution of contracted-out rebate into an APP account was f9.00 
per week in  1992-93  for a man  (roughly f11.00,  or U.S.$17.00, in current 
prices) and E6.00 per week in 1992-93  for a woman. These financial amounts 
are not large. 
For individuals  who lose  or leave their job, no statutory  contribution  is 
made. The proportion of APP members reporting zero earnings, and therefore 
zero statutory contributions, rose from 1 1 percent in 1987-88  to 2 1 percent in 
1992-93.  And, according to official statistics from the Department of Social 
Security, only half of those with APPs in  1992-93  who started their accounts 
before 1990-91 reported having positive earnings in every year. This low pro- 
portion is not surprising given the age profile of APP members, but it raises 
some concern as to whether all individuals with APP accounts will obtain rea- 
sonable incomes on retirement. This concern has permeated  some of the re- 
form proposals described by Budd and Campbell, in particular the idea of hav- 
ing higher  mandatory  minimum contributions  into these  individual  savings 
accounts. But it should be borne in mind that, given the differences in expected 
returns, APP members should be no worse off than were they to have remained 
in SERPS. 
Of some interest given these low “basic” contributions, and the recent debate 
in the United States concerning the effect of IRAs and 401(k) plans on savings, 
is the scope for making additional voluntary contributions into APP accounts. 
For various reasons, official data have been very poor on this question in the 
United Kingdom. However, waves 2-4  of the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) of incomes provide some interesting data on this issue. Official figures 
suggest that roughly  50 percent  of APP members make additional contribu- 132  Alan Budd and Nigel Campbell 
tions, and, according to BHPS data, mean weekly contributions (of those who 
contributed) were E11.60 in 1992, E12.50 in 1993, and E14.70 in 1994. These 
figures gross up to total additional contributions (savings) of some E2.2 billion 
in 1994, consistent with Inland Revenue data. 
Preliminary  tabulation of  the data suggest some degree of  persistence in 
savings behavior. For example, there is no tendency for the probability of con- 
tributing to decline with the duration since the APP contract was taken out. 
Furthermore, individuals who contributed at t -  1 are disproportionately more 
likely to contribute  a larger  amount at t, when controlling for background 
characteristics. But the evidence of variability in savings (and probably in job 
holding) is also strong: only 40 percent of the sample contributed in every year 
from  1992 to  1994. Of  those  who did not  contribute in  1994, 43 percent 
had made an additional contribution in  1993 and 59 percent in  1992. Con- 
versely, of those who did not contribute in  1993, 40 percent did contribute 
in 1994. 
Overall, the picture is of a minority of APP members who are engaged in a 
persistent lifetime savings strategy. Others, whether owing to myopia, youth, 
or searching the labor market for better jobs, have a more erratic record of 
contribution to their APPs. This instability, plus complaints over high selling 
charges and misselling of some APPs, has cast a cloud over the APP “privatiza- 
tion” in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the underlying fundamentals and 
the maturation of contributors give hope that this sector will become a central 
component of future pension provision in the United Kingdom. 
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Discussion Summary  Jeffrey Liebman and Andrew Samwick 
Many of the questions in the discussion focused on the unique “contracting- 
out” features of the British system. The contracting-out rebate is currently 4.8 
percent, falling to 4.6 out of a total 20.2 percent maximum tax rate on all social 
insurance  contributions.  The option to contract  out partially  does not exist. 
Many participants  asked whether it was optimal to contract out or to switch 
back and forth between SERPS and being contracted out. The authors replied 
that it was clearly optimal for younger workers to be contracted out and that the 
government has lost money owing to the switching back into SERPS later in life 
(any revenue shortfalls are simply made up out of general tax revenues). Re- 
cently enacted measures may have ameliorated the problem of gaming the sys- 
tem by capping the contracted-out rebates and having them increase with age. 
The discussion then turned to the issues of annuitization and inflation  for 
contracted-out workers. The market for annuities is organized on an individual 
basis and is composed of all workers who have contracted out with personal 
pensions.  The market  is only lightly regulated,  and it does not  appear that 
there is much screening of individuals by  companies. For example, much to 
the surprise of the conference participants, premiums are typically not made 
conditional on gender or health status. Approximately 50 percent of the funds 
are annuitized, and there is protection for spouses of those who have contracted 
out. The state benefits are indexed against inflation up to a limit. In the period 
since SERPS was enacted, most occupational pensions  have implemented at 
least a limited cost-of-living adjustment in order to satisfy the contracting-out 
requirement. There was some speculation as to why indexation was not full 
given the availability of indexed bonds. 
Other questions pertained to the way  workers who had used personal pen- 
sions to contract out were investing their accounts. It was pointed out that, in 
the Australian system, there was great concern that workers would invest too 
conservatively. The authors replied that workers in the United Kingdom did 
have control  over their  accounts  and that  most of  the funds are in equities. 
Furthermore,  the  personal  pensions  are  virtually  unregulated,  with  only 
“trustee law” and a few small safeguards to prevent disasters like the Max- 
well affair. 
Another question concerned the labor market consequences of the introduc- 
tion and subsequent reforms of SERPS. The authors responded that there were 
simply too many other changes taking place during this time period to identify 
the effects of  the privatization  on labor outcomes. 134  Alan Budd and Nigel Campbell 
The discussion concluded with questions about the political resistance to the 
recent reforms, given the large reduction in SERPS that they  seem to have 
made. The authors replied that the contracting-out rebate helped reduce oppo- 
sition. They also suggested that the fact that many people do not know that 
they are covered by SERPS may have led to the muted opposition. The govern- 
ment was also fortunate enough to have acted very early in the program so that 
there were few groups that had accumulated large entitlements at the time. The 
value of the basic pension is a more hotly contested political topic. 